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SELECTION AND EXAMINATION OF JURORS
MAX E. WILDMAN
E LAWYERS have often wondered why some cases result in
substantial verdicts for the plaintiffs and why others, on
seemingly similar facts, fall under the axe of "not guilty"
verdicts. In attempting to reach one result or the other, we frequently
extend ourselves in providing demonstrative evidence, culling up ob-
scure facts, and devoting great attention to final argument. As impor-
tant as all of these facets of a trial may be, nevertheless, the end result
often is greatly determined by the manner of selection of the venire-
men. For this purpose, let us consider the selection of a jury after the
panel of twelve is called into the jury box. Consequently, we will omit
those preliminary steps in the selection of the jury panel itself.
METHOD OF EXAMINATION
After the jury has been impanelled, it becomes
... the duty of the court, upon request of either party to the suit, or upon its
own motion, to order its full number of twelve jurors into the jury box, be-
fore either party shall be required to examine any of the said jurors touching
their qualifications to try any such causes.'
After these twelve jurors are in the box, the examination proceeds.
The court may first examine the jurors itself before allowing the coun-
sel to do so. This right is generally recognized 2 and has been specifi-
cally set forth by court rule in certain courts.8 The prospective jurors
are then examined by counsel. The court cannot refuse counsel this
right even though it has examined the jurors itself.4 However, it should
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 78, § 21.
2 Donovan v. People, 139 111. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (1891).
8 Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 49; County Court of Cook County, Rule 36.
4 Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (1891); American Bridgeworks v.
Pereira, 79 Ill. App. 90 (1898).
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be noted in this connection that some judges limit to a great extent
counsel's voir dire examination. While it is true that no abuse of the
privilege of examination of a juror by counsel should be allowed, it is
equally true that a serious limitation on the part of the litigants' coun-
sel actually amounts to a deprivation of our time-honored "right to
jury trial."
The time which counsel may use to examine jurors is largely left to
the discretion of the court' although in some courts the judge is given
the right by rule "to reasonably limit" the time.6 Lawyers who spend
much of their time actually trying cases have noticed that a prolonged
examination usually works to their detriment and to the detriment of
their client's interests. This seems to be particularly true when the trial
lawyer insists upon asking each juror the same stock questions which
have been put to each preceding venireman. On some occasions attor-
neys have been known to spend as much as several hours on a single
panel, and in civil cases it is highly questionable whether or not any
advantage results to the lawyer who prolongs his examination. More-
over, it is extremely doubtful whether or not he has a better measure
of such juror's qualifications. After such a prolonged examination by
one attorney, his adversary might well consider pointing up such an
onerous examination by merely asking a few short questions to the
group as a whole and then either accepting the panel or excusing one
or more as the case may be. In that way, the contrast is vividly
demonstrated to the entire jury panel.
The examination by the parties begins with the plaintiff. It is set
forth in the statute "that the jury shall be passed upon and accepted in
panels of four by the parties, commencing with the plaintiff."' 7 The
plaintiff may challenge jurors from the first panel of four and addi-
tional jurors will be added to the panel to replace those challenged. He
will continue to examine additional jurors until he has found four who
are acceptable to him. These four are then accepted and tendered to
the defendant.8
The defendant then examines the four jurors tendered by the plain-
tiff. If he challenges any, he must continue to examine additional jurors
5 Nealon v. People, 39 Ill. App. 481 (1890).
6 Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 49; County Court of Cook County, Rule 36.
7111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 78, § 21.
8 The tender of a panel of four implies acceptance of it. Maher v. New York C. &
St. L. R. Co., 280 Ill. App. 222 (1935).
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until he has found four who are acceptable to him. These additional
jurors tendered by the defendant are then examined by the plaintiff.
After the first panel of four has been accepted by both sides, counsel
will proceed to examine a second panel.9
It should be noted here that if the defendant breaks a panel which
plaintiff has tendered and substitutes another juror for the one who is
excused, plaintiff can then excuse any of those jurors whom he has
previously accepted." ° Until a panel has been accepted by both sides,
either side may challenge a juror previously accepted by it."
This rule frequently leads into some very interesting by-play be-
tween experienced trial counsel, particularly when few peremptory
challenges remain to one side or both. For example, let us assume that
the third panel is being examined and each side has one remaining chal-
lenge. Perhaps plaintiff's counsel finds three jurors with whom he is
quite content, one of whom, however, he is sure defendant's counsel
will excuse. The fourth juror may be questionable from plaintiff's
standpoint but he is reluctant to use his last challenge, not knowing
who will be substituted for the juror who the defendant will excuse. In
this situation, plaintiff can well afford to tender the entire panel to the
defendant. After defendant has exercised his last challenge and ten-
dered the panel with the new juror back to plaintiff, the latter can then
decide whether he would prefer to have the new juror or the one
which previously seemed questionable. Even the "strategy of chess"
enters into a jury trial!
The practice in the United States District Courts differs from the
Illinois practice in regard to a right of counsel to examine prospective
jurors. The federal rules of civil procedure provide as follows:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examina-
tion of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit
to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their at-
torneys as it deems proper. 12
It can thus be seen that unlike the Illinois practice, counsel in the
Federal Court have absolutely no right to examine the jurors. It is in
the discretion of the court whether to examine them itself, whether to
0 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 78, § 21.
10 People v. Gray, 251 I11. 431, 96 N.E. 268 (1911).
11 Ibid.
12 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 47 (a).
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permit examination by counsel, or whether to examine upon questions
submitted by counsel. This practice of strongly limiting counsel's
right to complete voir dire examination is more prevalent in the Fed-
eral District Court than in the state courts of Illinois. While the federal
rules are more confining, it should be noted that the Federal judges
in the Northern District of Illinois, in practice, actually allow trial
counsel sufficient leeway to afford satisfaction with the jury. Quite
obviously, the court has the problem of permitting counsel to exercise
what appears to be a "right" and at the same time prevent any abuse.
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
The purpose of the examination of jurors is to gain information
with which a party may intelligently exercise its challenges. 3 There
are two kinds of challenges and the jurors may be examined for the
purpose of exercising either. 4 These are challenges for cause and per-
emptory challenges. There is no limit to the number of challenges for
cause a party may make, but these, of course, must be ruled upon by
the court and can be granted only by the court. Generally, the
grounds for challenge for cause in Illinois are as follows:
A juror may be challenged who lacks the statutory qualifications
for jury service. These are generally set forth in the statute.'5 A person
may be challenged who has served as a juror during the year previous
to the trial. This challenge, however, applies only to persons who are
not members of the regular panel and therefore seems of little practical
consequence. Likewise, a person who is a party to any suit pending
for trial in the particular court may be challenged.' The qualifications
in the Federal Court are also set forth by statute.
13 People v. Robinson, 299 Ill. 617, 132 N.E. 803 (1921).
14 Moore v. Edmonds, 384 111. 535, 52 N.E. 2d 216 (1943).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 78, § 2 provides: "... . Jurors in all counties in Illinois must
have the legal qualifications herein prescribed, and shall be chosen a proportionate
number from the residents of each town or precinct, and such persons only as are:
First-Inhabitants of the town or precinct, not exempt from serving on juries. Second-
Of the age of twenty-one (21) years or upwards. Third-In the possession of their natu-
ral faculties and not infirm or decrepit. Fourth-Free from all legal exceptions, of fair
character, of approved integrity, of sound judgment, well informed, and who under-
stand the English language."
1I11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 78, § 14.
17 62 Stat. 951 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (1950) provides as follows:
"Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years and resides
within the judicial district, is competent to serve as a grand or petit juror unless:
(1) He has been convicted in a state or federal court of record of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored
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Generally speaking, bias against a party is grounds for challenge for
cause:
It is a fundamental principle, that every litigant has the right to be tried by
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. Bias or prejudice has always been
regarded as rendering jurymen incompetent. And when a juror avows that
one litigant should have any other than the advantage which the law and
evidence give him, he declares his incompetency to decide the case .... IS
In order to disqualify, the bias may be such as will require proof to
remove it. "A party should never be compelled to produce proof to
change a pre-conceived opinion or prejudice which may control the
action of the juror."' 9
A pre-conceived opinion as to the merits of the case may be grounds
for challenge for cause. In a very early case, the rule was laid down
... that if a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case, either
from a personal knowledge of the facts, from statements of witnesses, from
the relations of the parties, or either of them, or from rumor, and that opinion
is positive, and not hypothetical, and such as will probably prevent him from
giving an impartial verdict, the challenge should be allowed.20
The mere fact that a juror has formed an opinion "based upon news-
paper acounts, as to the truth of which he had no knowledge"' 21 would
not disqualify him. The question of the nature of the juror's opinion
and whether or not it is sufficient to disqualify is left to the discretion
of the trial court and will not be set aside unless "error is manifest. '22
As distinguished from a challenge for cause, a peremptory challenge
is one which is made without assigning a reason therefore and which
the court must allow. The Civil Practice Act covers the number of
challenges to which a party is entitled and provides as follows:
Each side shall be entitled to 5 peremptory challenges. If there is more than
one party on any side, the court may allow each side additional peremptory
by pardon or amnesty. (2) He is unable to read, write, speak, and understand the
English Language. (3) He is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities
to render efficient jury service. (4) He is incompetent to serve as a grand or petit
juror by the law of the State in which the district court is held."
62 Stat. 953 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1869 (1950) provides as follows: "In any district
court, a petit juror may be challenged on the ground that he has been summoned
and attended such court as a petit juror at any term held within one year prior to
the challenge."
1sChicago & Alton v. Adler, 56 Ill. 344, 346 (1870).
19 Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Schueller, 60 111. 465, 472 (1871).
20 Smith v. Eames, 4 111. 76, 80 (1841).
21Williams v. Supreme Court of Honor, 221 Ill. 152, 159, 77 N.E. 542, 54 (1906).
22 Ibid., at 158 and 543.
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challenges, not to exceed 3, on account of each additional party on the side
having the greatest number of parties. Each side shall be allowed an equal num-
ber of peremptory challenges. If the parties on a side are unable to agree upon
the allocation of peremptory challenges among themselves, the allocation shall
be determined by the court.23
In the Federal Courts, parties are entitled to only three peremptory
challenges although if there is more than one defendant the court may
allow additional such challenges. 4 In actual practice counsel should
address the court and request leave to excuse a specific juror either for
cause or peremptorily. However, the formality of this practice is not
generally observed and usually counsel merely addresses the juror and
advises the prospective juror that he or she is excused.
Generally speaking, the scope of examination is limited to inquiry
such "as is reasonably necessary to determine whether or not they [the
jurors] have any bias or prejudice against either side." This is the
specific rule of several courts25 and has been confirmed in the cases.2
The scope of examination is generally left to the discretion of the
court and hence there are few decided cases in point.
The scope of examination has caused inexperienced trial lawyers
some embarrassment in the past. Frequently authors of trial technique
treatises and books will advise a young trial lawyer to "warm up" to
the jury during the course of his voir dire examination. From such dis-
cussions, fledgeling trial lawyers frequently get the impression that
they might even engage the prospective juror in conversational topics.
In a few cases, trial lawyers have attempted to discuss the number of
children in the juror's family, the neighborhood in which he resides,
aspects of his employment which have no bearing on the case and
other unrelated subjects. The story is told of a young lawyer who at-
tempted to discuss his problems regarding a television antenna with a
television repairman during the course of his voir dire examination.
Quite obviously, these subjects are inappropriate and it would not
appear that any answers given in response to such questions would
indicate the lack of qualifications or competency to try the particular
case.
All experienced trial lawyers have their own individual manner of
ferreting out delicate information tactfully from a prospective juror.
23111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, S 190 (1) (Civ. Prac. Act § 66).
2462 Stat. 953 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1870 (1950).
25 Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 49; County Court of Cook County, Rule 36.
2 6 Moore v. Edmonds, 384 I11. 535, 52 N.E. 2d 216 (1943).
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Such things as a woman's age, marital status in some instances, medical
histories, and other personal subjects must be covered with finesse. In
a medical malpractice suit, for example, the case at bar may involve
alleged negligence in the performance of a hysterectomy. Obviously,
the experiences of a middle-aged woman in particular might be very
important in determining the individual juror's qualifications to serve,
and yet such a juror may be very reluctant to discuss her own per-
sonal experiences. An improperly directed question under such cir-
cumstances might well determine at that very point how that particu-
lar juror will vote when the first ballot is cast at the conclusion of the
case. The phrasing of such questions under those circumstances be-
comes vitally important, particularly if one has few remaining per-
emptory challenges.
One subject which has come up from time to time is the right of
counsel to interrogate as to a prospective juror's interest is an insur-
ance company which is defending the suit. This subject has been the
cause of considerable litigation and today remains unsettled. The latest
expression of the Illinois courts is Wheeler v. Rudek.27 The court here
reviews the older decisions and says generally that:
.. a principle of law that runs through all the cases is that, in an action of this
kind where defendant carried public liability insurance, the plaintiff has the
right, within certain limitations, to interrogate prospective jurors on their
voir dire as to their interest and relationship to insurance companies that carry
such insurance.28
The cases generally require a showing of good faith by plaintiff before
such an examination can be made but shed little light on the manner
and sufficiency of this showing.29
It would be extremely difficult, and at the same time fruitless, to
attempt to list those subjects of inquiry which, in all probability,
should be covered in a given case on the voir dire examination. No two
cases are the same, and even seemingly similar automobile accident
cases involve different considerations in selecting a jury. Certainly
trial counsel would want to consider the age, race and background,
employment and appearance of the two litigants. Other factors, such
27 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E. 2d 601 (1947).
28 Ibid., at 441 and 602.
20Moore v. Edmonds, 384 I11. 535, 52 N.E. 2d 216 (1943); Kavanaugh v. Parret,
379 Ill. 273, 40 N.E. 2d 500 (1942); Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime Co., 378 111. 180,
37 N.E. 2d 801 (1941); Smithers v. Henriques, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N.E. 2d 499 (1938).
See comment, Disclosures of Insurer's Interest in voir dire Examination of Jurors in
Illinois, 43 111. L. Rev. 650 (1948).
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as the witnesses expected to testify on either side, location of the
occurrence and nature of the injuries, should receive consideration.
From all of this, the trial lawyer should eventually find himself faced
with the question, "Will this juror be inclined to sympathize with my
client's plight, or will he most likely favor my opponent's case?"
Common prejudices and biases play a greater or lesser roll in the
jury's determination of any factual question, but it would seem that
the main object of any trial counsel in selecting a jury should be to
select those veniremen who can lay aside whatever "every day" preju-
dices and feelings they may have and decide the case strictly on the
merits. Somehow or other, whether divinely guided or not, juries gen-
erally reach sound, fair decisions; and from the moment the trial
lawyer speaks to the jury during the course of the voir dire examina-
tion until the end of the final argument, jurors sense whatever feelings
trial counsel may have and oftentimes even the feelings of their clients.
If this be so, there can be no question but that courts and trial judges
in general, while striving to avoid any abuse of our jury system, should
interpret all rules and precedents broadly enough to ensure the feeling
on the part of both lawyer and litigant that he had sufficient oppor-
tunity to select "The Peerless Twelve."
